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Abstract

Project Summary

Main Result

We investigated the security of the SmartDongle Device produced by MicroWorks. The fundamental security
idea is that the device computes and communicates ‘x, y’ pairs from a given equation. The security was based
on the computational difficulty of determining the parameter ‘A’ of the equation y = Ax mod n given these
‘x’ and ‘y’ values.

For the last three decades, hash functions have been an essential
element of the cryptography used for securing computers and
electronic communications. The SmartDongle is a flash drive
produced by MicroWorks and is meant to secure data and assure
authorized use of software. In this project, we investigate the
security of certain cryptographic techniques used in the current
implementation of the SmartDongle’s authentication protocol.
In particular, we analyze how the use of Merkle-Damgård hash
functions based on a simplified version of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) can affect the SmartDongle's
security. Our study involves extensive computational
experimentation and analysis that produced a range of
conjectures about the security of the SmartDongle.
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• We developed Java software to compute the possible ‘A’ values that would satisfy the given ‘x’ and ‘y’
values.
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• Using these graphs, we discovered patterns that assisted in finding the correct ‘A’ values when they were
unknown
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• We developed software that would compute the values of the original protocol and the hashed protocol
• These values would then be exported to Excel and graphed for the purpose of comparison.
• The pattern previously followed by the correct ‘A’ value was disguised, though all possible ‘A’ values
converged where ‘x’ was equal to a factor of ‘n’.
• Rehashing ‘y’ a number of times based on A modulo the factor of n eliminated these collisions.

Regular Protocol

AES Hashed Protocol
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Though some encryption schemes run into a problem of
reversing the encryption in repeated applications of the
encryption, AES does not appear to suffer from this,
allowing us to eliminate collisions by rehashing ‘y’ a
number of times based on a modulus of A that is equal to
the factor of n (in this example, A mod 3). We successfully
disguise A while ensuring that ‘y’ is not hashed to the
same value at a given ‘x’ for any other possible A.

• We created a hash function based on AES and the Merkle-Damgård Schema to hash the ‘y’ values.

The Merkle-Damgård Schema is a function that can be used in
producing a collision-resistant hash function. The message
(M) is split into blocks of a fixed size which are then
computed through AES individually. The output from the
previous computation is then used as the key in the following
computation, until all blocks have been computed. The final
output is then the hashed text.
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• This software would export large amounts of data to Excel which would then be used to create graphs of
the ‘A’ values.

Merkle-Damgård Schema
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Future Work

The pattern of the regular protocol is easily identifiable
and vulnerable to attack due to its predictability with just a
small amount of data collection. There are also several
collision points, making it possible for imposter dongles to
authenticate.
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The pattern of ‘A’ value is disguised by AES encryption
of the ‘y’ value. However, all possible ‘A’ values
converge to the same value where x is equal to a factor of
‘n.’ This is an algebraic vulnerability of the function that
exists with or without hashing any values.

The computation time for rehashing with the large primes that
would typically be used as factors of n could be large enough
to bring the practicality of this into question. However, other
functions might be used to generate unique keys for rehashing
and drastically reduce the amount of times a y values would
need to be rehashed to avoid collisions.

